More proof-reading

HarmfulCommunications201908.org

@@ -445,14 +445,14 @@
      relevant protocols.
    - Due to the maturity and age of these protocols, software needed
      to use them is now abundant and trivially easy to get and install
-     and run on a computer. Such software is also very easy to develop
-     for moderately-skilled software engineers.
+     and run on any general-purpose computer. Such software is also
+     very easy to develop for moderately-skilled software engineers.
    - Neither the protocols that define, nor the software that
      implement the internet regard any computer to be superior or
      inferior to any other computer. For this reason, there is no cost
-     or capacity barrier for someone to cross in order to run an
-     internet service: if you have the software, and the internet
-     connection, then you can expose such a service.
+     or capacity barrier to running an internet service: if you have
+     the software, and the internet connection, then you can expose
+     an online service.
 
    Clear examples from the past of how the accessibility of the
    internet technologies has benefited the world include the
@@ -500,14 +500,14 @@
      a photographer, John Oringer, who developed the service as a
      means to make available 30,000 of his own photographs.
 
-   The ease with which internet technology can be accessed has given
-   rise to the explosion of services that connect people, and people
-   with businesses.
+   The ease with which internet technology can be accessed is
+   instrumental in the explosion of services that connect people, and
+   people with businesses.
 
    It is critical to note that many of these technologies and services
    started out with an individual or small group developing an idea
    and showing it can work *prior* to receiving the large capital
-   investments that result in their current dominance.
+   investments that resulted in their current dominance.
 
    All of the above technologies and services can be considered truly
    disruptive. In their respective domains, their arrivals resulted in
@@ -534,7 +534,9 @@
    or instance. For administrators of instances, federation means that
    they can configure their instances according to their own
    preferences, rather than having to abide by the rules or technical
-   implementation of someone else.
+   implementation of someone else. For the ecosystem, federation means
+   that if one node goes down or is attacked, the others can continue
+   with a minimum of interruption.
 
 ** CONSDONE Regulation of self-hosted services
 
@@ -543,14 +545,15 @@
    regulations don't harm the desire of those who want to create
    their own services.
 
-   A regulation that apply liability to a service-provider for someone
-   else's behaviour, is a regulation that can be adhered to only by
-   organisations with large amounts of money to hand. For example, if
-   the regulation was to apply liability on me for a posting made by
-   someone else that appears on one of the services that I run (and
-   originally posted *somewhere* else -- these are federated services
-   after all), I would have to shut it down; I am not able to put in
-   place the necessary infrastructure that would mitigate my
+   A regulation that applies liability to a service-provider for
+   someone else's behaviour is a regulation that can be adhered to
+   only by organisations with large amounts of money to hand. For
+   example, if the regulation was to apply liability on me for a
+   posting made by someone else that appears on one of the services
+   that I run (and likely originally posted *somewhere* else -- these
+   are federated services after all), I would have to shut it down; I
+   am not able to put in place the necessary technical or legal
+   infrastructure that would mitigate my
    liability[fn:copyrightDirective:This assumes that my services
    aren't forced to shut down by the new EU Copyright Directive
    anyway]. Given that my services are intended to provide a positive
@@ -572,24 +575,24 @@
    regulations have the effect[fn:unintended:unintended, one hopes] of
    harming such small operators, the result will not just be the loss
    of these services, but also the loss of opportunity to make the Web
-   richer by means of the imposition of artificial barriers to
-   entry. Such regulations will inhibit the development of ideas that
-   pop into the heads of individuals, who will realise them with
+   richer because artificial barriers to entry will be imposed by
+   those regulations. They will inhibit the development of ideas that
+   pop into the heads of individuals, who would realise them with
    nothing more than a computer connected to the internet.
 
 * CONSDONE Other considerations
   While the main focus of this submission is to highlight the
-  potential risk to self-hosters from regulation that neglect to
+  potential risk to self-hosters from regulations that neglect to
   consider the practice, I would like to take the opportunity to
   briefly raise some additional concerns
 
-** CONSDONE Abuse
+** CONSDONE Abuse of the systems
 
    To date, all systems that seek to protect others from harmful or
    other objectionable material (e.g. copyright infringement,
-   terrorism propaganda, etc.) have, to date, been very amenable to
-   abuse. For example, in a recent court filing, Google claimed that
-   99.97% of infringement notices it received in from a single party
+   terrorism propaganda, etc.) have been easily amenable to abuse. For
+   example, in a recent court filing, Google claimed that 99.97% of
+   copyright infringement notices it received in from a single party
    in January 2017 were
    bogus[fn:googleTakedown:https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170223/06160336772/google-report-9995-percent-dmca-takedown-notices-are-bot-generated-bullshit-buckshot.shtml]:
 
@@ -609,19 +612,16 @@
    index.
    #+END_QUOTE
 
-   That a single entity would submit more than 16 million URLs for
-   delisting in a single month is staggering, and demonstrates a
-   compelling point: there is no downside for a bad-faith actor
-   seeking to take advantage of a system for suppressing
-   information[fn:downside:The law being used in this specific case is
-   the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It contains a provision
+   With the US' Digital Millennium Copyright Act, there is no downside
+   for a bad-faith actor seeking to take advantage of a system for
+   suppressing information[fn:downside:The law contains a provision
    that claims of copyright ownership on the part of the claimant are
    to be made under penalty of perjury. However, that provision is
    very weak, and seems not to be a deterrent for a determined agent:
    https://torrentfreak.com/warner-bros-our-false-dmca-takedowns-are-not-a-crime-131115].
 
    The GDPR's /Right to be Forgotten/ is also subject to abuse. An
-   individual from Europe continues to have stories related to him
+   individual from Europe continues to force stories related to him
    excluded from Google searches. However appropriate on the face of
    it, the stories this individual is now getting suppressed relate to
    his continued abuse of the /Right to be
@@ -637,87 +637,94 @@
    need to.
 
    In systems that facilitate censorship[fn:censorship:While seeking
-   to achieve a valuable and socially important goal, this
-   legislation, and all others of its nature, facilitates censorship:
-   as a society, we should not be so squeamish about admitting this.],
-   it is important to do more than merely assert that service
-   providers should protect fundamental rights for expression and
-   information. In a regime where sending an e-mail costs nearly
-   nothing, where a service risks serious penalties (up to and
-   including having to shut down) and where a claimant suffers nothing
-   for abusive claims, the regime is guaranteed to be abused.
+   to achieve a valuable and socially important goal, legislation of
+   nature facilitates censorship: as a society, we should not be so
+   squeamish about admitting this.], it is important to do more than
+   merely assert that service providers should regard fundamental
+   rights for expression and information. In a regime where sending an
+   e-mail costs nearly nothing, where a service risks serious
+   penalties (up to and including having to shut down) and where a
+   claimant suffers nothing for abusive claims, the regime is
+   guaranteed to be abused.
 
 ** CONSDONE Content Moderation
 
-   Much of the focus on legislative efforts to deal with harmful or
-   objectionable material on services that permit uploads from users is
-   on what the service providers do about it. Many argue that they are
-   not doing anything, or at least not enough.
+   Much of the focus of legislative efforts to deal with harmful or
+   objectionable material that appear on services that permit uploads
+   from users is on what the service providers do about it. Many argue
+   that they are not doing anything, or at least not enough.
 
    However, this is an unfortunate mischaracterisation of the
    situation. For example, facebook employs -- either directly or
    through out-sourcing contracts -- many 10s of thousands
    "moderators", whose job is to make a decision to remove offensive
    material or not, to suppress someone's freedom of expression or
-   not, based on a set of if-then-else questions.
+   not, based on a set of if-then-else questions. These questions are
+   not easy:
    - It's illegal in Germany to say anything that can be construed as
-     glorifying the Holocaust. In the UK it isn't. Facebook can
+     glorifying the Holocaust. In the US it isn't. Facebook can
      suppress such information from users it believes are in Germany,
-     but to do so for those in the UK would be an illegal denial of
+     but to do so for those in the US would be an illegal denial of
      free expression, regardless of how objectionable the material
      is. What is facebook to do with users in Germany who route their
      internet connections through the UK? Facebook has no knowledge of
-     this unusual routing, and to learn about it could be a violation
-     of the user's right to privacy. Should facebook be criminally
-     liable for a German user seeing statements that are illegal in
-     Germany?
-   - Consider the genocide of Armenian people in Turkey in 1915. It is
-     illegal to claim it happened in Turkey. However, for a period
+     this unusual routing, and to seek to learn about it could be a
+     violation of the user's right to privacy. Should facebook be
+     criminally liable for a German user seeing statements that are
+     illegal in Germany?
+   - Consider the genocide of Armenian people in Turkey in 1915. In
+     Turkey it is illegal to claim it happened. However, for a period
      between 2012 and 2017 it was illegal in France to claim it didn't
      happen. In most other countries, neither claim is illegal. What
      can a service like facebook do when faced with 3 options, 2 of
-     which are mutually exclusive?  Literally, should they be
+     which are mutually exclusive?  Literally, they would be
      criminally liable both if they do /and/ if they
      don't[fn:dink:Prior to his assassination in Istanbul in 2007,
      Hrant Dink, an ethnic Armenian Turkish journalist who campaigned
      against Turkey's denial of the Armenian Genocide had planned to
      travel to France to deny it in order to highlight the
-     contradictions with laws that criminalise statements of fact. ]?
+     contradictions with laws that criminalise statements of fact.]?
 
    Moderators have no more than a minute to determine whether a
-   statement complies with the law of not, and this includes figuring
+   statement complies with the law or not, and this includes figuring
    out whether the posting meets the definitions of abusive or
    harmful, and whether it is indeed intended to meet that
    definition. For example, consider an abusive tweet. Should the
    harmful, abusive tweet be removed? Who decides? What if the target
    of the abusive tweet wants that tweet to be retained, for, say
-   evidence? What if the tweet was an attempt at abuse, but the target
-   chose not to be affected by it? Should it stay up? Who decides?
-   What if the target doesn't care, but others who see the tweet but
-   who aren't the target of the abuse may be offended by it. Should it
-   be taken down as abusive even though the target of the abuse
-   doesn't care, or objects to its removal? Who would be criminally
-   liable in these situations? What if the target of the abuse
-   substantially quotes the abusive tweets? Is the target now to be
-   considered an offender under a criminal liability regime when that
-   person may be doing nothing other than /highlighting/ abuse?
+   future evidence in a claim? What if the tweet was an attempt at
+   abuse, but the target chose not to be affected by it? Should it
+   stay up? Who decides? What if the target doesn't care, but others
+   who see the tweet and are not the target of the abuse may be
+   offended by it. Should it be taken down as abusive even though the
+   target of the abuse doesn't care, or objects to its removal? Who
+   would be criminally liable in these situations? What if the target
+   of the abuse substantially quotes the abusive tweets? Is the target
+   now to be considered an offender under a criminal liability regime
+   when that person may be doing nothing other than /highlighting/
+   abuse?
+
+   All of these scenarios are valid and play out every day. Content
+   moderators need to consider these and many more questions, but get
+   very little time to do so. The result: a public perception,
+   promoted by public figures, that these large services are doing
+   nothing about abuse.
 
    "Content moderation" is very hard, and is impossible at the scales
    that services like twitter or facebook operate in. When context is
-   critical in deciding whether to decide someone is engaged in
-   harmful or abusive behaviour, it would be fundamentally unfair to
-   make a service criminally liable just because it made the wrong
-   decision as it didn't have time to determine the full context, or
-   because it misinterpreted or misunderstood the context.
+   critical to decide that someone is engaged in harmful or abusive
+   behaviour, it would be fundamentally unfair to make a service
+   criminally liable just because it made the wrong decision as it
+   didn't have time to determine the full context, or because it
+   misinterpreted or misunderstood the context.
 
 ** CONSDONE User Behaviour
    Many believe that the way to deal with abusive or harmful material
    online is to punish the services that host the material. This is
    reasonable if the material was placed onto the service by those who
-   own or manage the service. It is also reasonable if the material is
-   put there by users with the clear knowledge of the managers or
-   owners of the service, or by users following encouragement of the
-   managers or owners of the service.
+   operate the service. It is also reasonable if the material is put
+   there by users with the clear knowledge of the service operator, or
+   by users following encouragement of the operators of the service.
 
    However, these specific situations are rare in the world of normal
    online services[fn:criminal:Services that are dedicated to hosting
@@ -732,8 +739,7 @@
    the communication is made. The idea that internet services are
    responsible for abusive communications is as difficult to
    understand as the idea that a table-saw manufacturer is responsible
-   for a carpenter not wearing safety glasses which using to to cut
-   timber.
+   for a carpenter not wearing safety glasses.
 
    Recent history has shown that the most effective ways to change
    behaviour are not necessarily punitive. It's hard to see how