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#+date: \today
#+TITLE: Submission to the Committee on Justice and Equality on /issues of online harassment, harmful communications and related offences/.
#+AUTHOR: Éibhear Ó hAnluain
#+EMAIL: eibhear.geo@gmail.com, 086 8565 666, http://www.gibiris.org/eo-blog/
#+OPTIONS: ^:{} toc:2 H:4 num:t author:t email:nil
#+TODO: CONSTODO CONSNOTES | CONSDONE CONSDONTDO
* Planning :noexport:
** Resources :noexport:
- [[https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/committees/submissions/20190808-committee-on-justice-and-equality-calls-for-submissions-on-online-harassment-and-harmful-communications/][Call for submissions]]
- [[https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/32/joint_committee_on_justice_and_equality/other/2019/2019-08-08_possible-issues-for-address_en.pdf][List of possible issues]]
** Web page (captured [2019-08-24 Sat])
The Committee on Justice and Equality invites written submissions
from stakeholders and interested parties on the issues of online
harassment, harmful communications and related offences.
[[https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/committees/32/justice-and-equality/][Go to the Committee on Justice and Equality]]
A separate document can be obtained at the following [[https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/32/joint_committee_on_justice_and_equality/other/2019/2019-08-08_possible-issues-for-address_en.pdf][link]] outlining
in detail the list of possible issues the Committee wishes to
address under this broad heading.
In summary, the Committee wishes to examine the nature and extent
of the problems of online ‘cyber bullying’, harassment, stalking,
‘revenge porn’ and other forms of harmful communications;
international best practice for addressing these problems; whether
self-regulation of harmful communications by social media companies
is the best approach; or whether new laws are necessary to cover
such activities, and what forms such laws should take.
The Committee will commence a series of public hearings on these
issues on 2 October 2019, with a view to publishing a report.
*** Closing date
The closing date for receipt of submissions is Friday, 20
September 2019.
*** How to send your submission
Please email an electronic document (PDF/MS Word or equivalent) to
[[mailto:onlineharassment@oireachtas.ie][onlineharassment@oireachtas.ie]].
Please do not send hard copies of your submission; hard copies
will not be accepted.
Please do not send your submission to individual Committee
members. The Clerk will ensure all members receive copies of all
submissions.
*** What to include in your submission
Your submission should comprise your submission document and a
separate covering letter. This allows the Committee to publish
your submission without your contact details.
**** In the covering letter, please include:
- your name, postal address, email address and contact telephone
number
- if the submission is on behalf of an organisation, your
position in the organisation
- a brief outline of why you are making the submission
**** In the submission document please include:
- a brief introduction, for example, explaining your area of
expertise
- any factual information that you have to offer from which the
Committee might be able to draw conclusions, or which could be
put to other parties for their reactions
- links to any publications you refer to; there is no need to
send such publications as attachments
- any recommendations to the Committee; be as specific as
possible and summarise your recommendations at the end of the
document
- if your document is more than 10 pages long, an executive
summary of the main points made in the submission
Please remember to be concise and to number your pages.
*** Important information
Submissions sent to any other email address may not be accepted.
Anonymous submissions cannot be accepted and will be rejected.
Petitions and form letters may not be accepted or published.
Submissions made to a Committee may be published as received,
either as part of a Committee report or separately, if the
Committee decides to do so.
*** Making a submission is a public process
The Committee is not obliged to accept your document once it has
been submitted, nor is it obliged to publish any or all of the
submission if it has been accepted. However, the operations of a
parliament are a public process, and you should be aware that any
submissions made to a Committee including your identity may be
published either as part of a Committee report, or separately, if
the Committee decides to do so.
*** Need more guidance?
If you would like more detailed guidance, please read the guidance
note Making Submissions and Presentations to Oireachtas Committees
below or contact the clerk to the Committee.
*** Clerk to the Committee
Damian Byrne
[[mailto:damian.byrne@oireachtas.ie][damian.byrne@oireachtas.ie]]
(01) 618 3899
Committee on Justice and Equality
Committee Secretariat,
Houses of the Oireachtas Service,
Kildare Street,
Dublin 2,
D02 XR20
** Possible issues document (captured [2019-08-24 Sat])
*** Online Harrassment, harmful communications and related offences
*Possible issues for address*
**** Definition of communication in legislation
1. There are currently significant gaps in legislation with
regard to harassment and newer, more modern forms of
communication. Is there a need to expand the definition of
‘communications’ to include online and digital communications
tools such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Snapchat, etc. when
addressing crimes of bullying or harassment?
- Éibhear comment :: (/Address in introduction/) It is
necessary not to assume that the current services that
operate will be the primary services in 5 or 10 years'
time.
2. What lessons can be learned from models used in other
jurisdictions such as the UK, New Zealand, Australia and other
European countries where legislation is now in place to
address these issues? How do we establish an appropriate model
without compromising free speech?
- Éibhear comment :: (/Address in answer to specific
questions/) UK: duty of care is inappropriate. New
Zealand: allowing a committee to decide what is
objectionable, thus restricting not only those who want
to share objectionable material, but also those who want
to report on it.
3. How do we ensure that any legislation that is enacted is
flexible enough to keep up with changing and advancing
technologies, new apps and other online forums, including the
more familiar social media sites?
- Éibhear's comments :: (/Core concern/) Hmm. This is the meat
of the submission.
**** Harassment, stalking & other forms of online abuse
4. [@4] Online harassment can take the form of on-consensual
taking and distribution of intimate images or videos,
otherwise known as ‘revenge porn’, ‘upskirting’,
‘downblousing’ and other forms of sharing of imagery online
without consent. What approaches are taken to addressing these
issues in other jurisdictions?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
5. New offences are proposed to cover these issues in Deputy
Brendan Howlin’s Private Members Bill on this subject. Is the
creation of new offences necessary, or is existing legislation
sufficient? Should other forms of image-sharing issues - such
as exposure - also be addressed?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
6. What kind of oversight and regulation of online service
providers is possible/used in other jurisdictions? Currently,
online providers are self regulated. Is a proactive,
self-regulating approach from online companies to activities
such as revenge porn and other forms of harassment preferable
to the creation of more laws?
- Éibhear's comment :: Important to know the difference
between "self regulated", and pro-active
moderation. These service moderation according to their
own rules; there is no industry authority like the press
council or the advertising standards authority, which are
self-regulatory regimes.
7. Is any data provided by online service providers in relation
to the reporting or prevalence of activities such as
upskirting/revenge porn/cyberbullying and other online
behaviour that can be used to develop and draft future
legislation?
- Éibhear's comment :: No data. However, services should be
encouraged to issue reports on their moderation efforts.
8. To what extent are An Garda Síochána equipped and resourced to
deal with the issues arising from harmful online
communications such as these?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
9. Should ‘cyberstalking’ be treated as a separate offence to
online harassment? What constitutes stalking-type behaviour
online? Is there a need to legislative specifically for this
activity?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
10. Based on the findings of other jurisdictions such as in the
UK, An Garda Síochána will require consistent training in
order to maintain an appropriate level of knowledge with
regard to indictable behaviours. Are resources available for
this?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
11. Fake accounts/troll accounts used to harass or target others
with abuse – what measures can be taken in relation to these
without effecting freedom of expression?
- Éibhear's comment :: Care needs to be taken to ensure
manage/prevent false identification of accounts as 'fake'
or 'troll'.
12. Do other jurisdictions have statutory measures to protect
victim identities in cases of online harassment being
released online posthearings, etc?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
**** Harmful online behaviour and young people
13. [@13] How do we most appropriately regulate social media
platforms to prevent cyberbullying and inappropriate sharing
of personal images?
- Éibhear's comment :: take details from earlier submission.
14. For young people who participate in such online behaviour as
consensual image sharing, how can it be ensured that they are
not inadvertently criminalised when legislation is enacted?
What safeguards can be put in place?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
15. Deputy Brendan Howlin’s Private Members Bill provides that
those under 17 should not be fined/imprisoned but put into
relevant education or supports. Would these supports be part
of the same educational supports offered to all young
people/schools or would they be a separate entity? Are
current supports being utilised? Are there sufficient
resources to provide for such a provision when enacted?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
** CONSTODO Eibhear's initial thoughts :noexport:
1. Focus on two core principles:
- Self-hosting -- individuals and groups hosting their own
services should not be neglected.
- Abuse -- services and systems should be protected from abuse
*** Facts
- Tweets per day: 500,000,000
+ Active accouts: 326,000,000
+ Reported accounts: 11,000,257 (July - December 2018)
* Abuse, child sexual exploitation, hateful conduct, private information, Sensitive media, voilent threats
* => 60,000 account reported/day
* => 0.02% of accounts reported
* CONSDONTDO The distinction between user behaviours and online services :noexport:
The internet is awash with online harassment and harmful
communications, and responsible governments and legislators have
been trying for decades to do something about it.
However, it's no less true in this sphere than in any other that
"doing something" is not necessarily enough to address the problem:
doing only the /right thing/ it what's required.
In the first of his 6 Laws of
Technology[fn:6laws:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melvin_Kranzberg#Kranzberg's_laws_of_technology],
Dr. Melvin Kranzberg determined that "Technology is neither good nor
bad; nor is it neutral." The tempation on observers is to decide
that the extent of online harassment, abuse and harmful
communications is because of the existence of online services, and
that if only we could force the services to implement their
technologies in a particular manner, all the problems will be
solved.
For instance, the United States of America recently enacted a law
known as the "Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act", or
/FOSTA-SESTA/[fn:FOSTA-SESTA:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stop_Enabling_Sex_Traffickers_Act]. This
was a law to show that the U.S. Congress was doing something to stop
sex-trafficking. The law made it an offence for online services to
"knowingly [assist], [support], or [facilitate]" sex-trafficking,
and it removed from online services speech-related protections that
had been previously provided under another U.S. law known as the
"Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act".
Accounts show, however, that doing *this* was not effective, and has
been counter-productive. As expected, a number of websites that had
been used to legally advertise sex services in the United States
either shut down that section of their service (e.g. Craigslists'
"Erotic Services"), or shutdown completely[fn:SOSTAEffect:Lura
Chamberlain, FOSTA: A Hostile Law with a Human Cost, 87 Fordham
L. Rev. 2171 (2019). Available at:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss5/13]. If the goal of the
law was to protect sex workers, and women in particular, it has had
the opposite effect:
- Independent sex workers now have no online means to promote their
services, forcing them to turn to pimps for this.
- There has been a notable increase in the number of sex workers who
have gone missing.
- Some sex-workers have died by suicide.
- Assault and rape of sex workers has increased, and many fear that
murders of sex workers are also
increasing[fn:craigslisthomicide:http://www.econlib.org/archives/2018/01/craigslist_redu.html].
- Sex workers have no means to learn about their potential clients
prior to the client knowing about them: where they could vet
people who made contact with them over these services before
identifying themselves, this is not possible anymore, and
dramatically increases their risk.
- Ironically, one of the negative effects of /FOSTA-SESTA/ is that
it is now much harder for the police to investigate rapes,
assaults and murders of sex workers than before, because a
critical trail of evidence -- the online communications between
offenders and sex-workers -- now can no longer be
laid[fn:FOSTAPolice:https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180705/01033440176/more-police-admitting-that-fosta-sesta-has-made-it-much-more-difficult-to-catch-pimps-traffickers.shtml]. This
is not least because the websites are no longer there, but because
when they were (e.g. Backpage), they assisted the police
investigating these crimes against sex workers; advertising was
legal back then, and now it's not, the police won't get the help
from web sites when they need
it[fn:SESTAPolice:https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180509/13450339810/police-realizing-that-sesta-fosta-made-their-jobs-harder-sex-traffickers-realizing-made-their-job-easier.shtml].
This was predicted, but by advocates for sex workers and for free
speech, and legislators failed to heed the warnings. In fact, when
considering this law, legislators were presented with statistics
that were false, and misrepresented the landscape prior to enacting
/FOSTA-SESTA/[fn:buzzfeed:https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jennyheineman/sex-trafficking-myths-sesta-fosta].
I highlight this law in particular because it is both recent
(early 2018) and relevant. However it's not alone, and as we look at
pending legislation coming to us both domestically and from the EU,
it's hard not to see the same failures repeating:
- Pat Rabbitte's and Lorraine Higgins' bills, since withdrawn
- The EU Terrorism Content Directive...
- The new Copyright Directive...
-
* CONSDONE Introduction
My name is Éibhear Ó hAnluain and I have been working in software
engineering and IT systems design since 1994. I thank you for the
opportunity to submit this contribution to your analysis of /issues
of online harassment, harmful communications and related offences/.
In this submission I am seeking to highlight 3 core concerns:
- The distinction between user behaviours and online services.
- The nature of the online services from the perspective of small
operators
- The potential damage legislative measures can have on small
operators of online services
However, prior to addressing these topics, I would like to raise
some ambiguities that this wider discussion will encounter.
- The first is the meaning of the term /self-regulation/. If a
measure of self-regulation to address these concerns is
acceptable, then it would be necessary for public-perception
reasons, to be clear on what that means. /Self-regulation/ could
mean either where each service operator manages matters of
harassment and harmful communications according to their own rules
and processes. This is currently how the large service providers
we're most familiar with operate. However, /self-regulation/ may
also refer to regulation by a non-governmental industry-funded
body, following the model of the press council or the advertising
standards authority, where rules and processes are agreed among
the operators as a set of standards, and where decisions of
compliance to these are made by this body.
In order to avoid this ambiguity, I will use the term
"self-moderation" to refer to the former, and the term
"industry-regulation" for the latter.
* CONSDONE Self-hosting
** CONSDONE Self-hosting
For the purposes of this submission, /self-hosting/ is where an
individual or small group has opted to provide their own internet
services, making use either of computer capacity provided by an ISP
(for example, Blacknight.com, Amazon AWS) or by maintaining the
computer technology themselves.
The services that the self-hoster exposes, then, are either
developed specifically by the self-hoster or runs software that has
been installed by the self-hoster.
The self-hoster also takes responsibility for the quality of the
service that they provide, including ensuring that it is kept
running and updates are applied appropriately, and so on.
This submission is primarilty concerned about self-hosting as a
hobby and self-hosting engaged in by charity, non-governmental or
community organisations. However, self-hosting for commercial
purposes is a valid use-case, but implications of regulations on
self-hosting has more a direct implication on the former use-cases,
as the effect of poor regulation on vulnerable people would be more
direct, immediate and serious.
*** CONSTODO Real examples of self-hosting
I host a number of such services:
- [[http://www.gibiris.org/eo-blog][/Éibhear/Gibiris/]] is my blog site.
- [[https://social.gibiris.org/][/Social Gibiris/]] is a micro-blogging service that is federated
with others using the /AtomPub/ technology. Thus, /Social
Gibiris/ is federated with many other instances of /GNU Social/,
/Mastodon/ and /Pleroma/. This network of federated services,
operated by individuals, groups and businesses, all connected
together as peers, facilitate connections and communication in a
way that is very little different to twitter.
- [[https://git.gibiris.org/][/git.gibiris.org/]] is a source-code sharing site that I use to
make publicly available some of the software that I develop for
myself.
- [[https://news.gibiris.org/][/news.gibiris.org/]] is a news-aggregation that allows me to
gather all the news sources of interest to me into one location,
which I can then access from wherever I am.
- [[https://cloud.gibiris.org/nextcloud][/cloud.gibiris.org/]] is a file-sharing platform that I use with
my family when we are collaborating on projects (e.g. school
projects, home improvement projects, etc.)
- [[https://matrix.gibiris.org/][/matrix.gibiris.org/]] is an instant-messaging system which I set
up for the purposes of communicating with my family and close
friends.
Most of these services are hosted on a computer within my home. 3
of these services provide information to the general public, and
the other three are accessible only to those who set up accounts.
2 of those services, /git.gibiris.org/ and /Social Gibiris/ can
process or post user-uploaded information.
*** CONSTODO Why self-host?
There is a myriad of reasons for choosing to host one's own
service. Some examples might be:
- Privacy -- until recently many services were careless or
outright abusive users' privacy
- Tracking -- the extent to which organisations, particularly
those whose business models are based on advertising, facilitate
the tracking of internet users as they conduct their business or
personal activities across the internet.
- Autonomy -- to be able to configure ones own service is often a
powerful experience.
- Community -- While some of the global services with household
names offer features go small businesses and community groups
(like footall clubs or debating societies), often the lock-in
and exclusivity involved can make it hard to include everyone
who needs to be involved. Hosting your own services allows you
to set the rules and codes of conduct.
- Experimentation -- just by means of playing with interesting
software projects can people often learn about the tools and
systems they use, and grow their knowledge of the technologies
involved.
- Collaboration -- the softwas that implements self-hosted
services often some under the terms of a Free or Open Source
Software copyright licence, which allows for peope to copy and
improve software, and these improvements often find their back
to the original project for others to benefit.
- Protection -- Governments in countries where civil rights are
not regarded as highly as they are in Ireland very often delight
in the greater ease involved in surveilling their populations
when the record of all that activity is centralised in a single
service.
Very often, as with me, the reason to self-host is a combination
of more than 1 of these reasons.
** CONSDONE How accessible is self-hosting.
In a previous, similar, submission[fn:dccae:Available [[http://www.gibiris.org/eo-blog/posts/2019/04/15_harmful-content-consultation.html][here]] and
[[https://www.dccae.gov.ie/en-ie/communications/consultations/Documents/86/submissions/Eibhear_O_HAnluain.pdf][here]].], I provide an outline of the challenges before someone who
wants to set up their own services. There are few, and they are
small. In summary, the reasons for this are:
- The Internet is mechanism for computers to find each other and
then to share information with each other. The mechanism is
defined in a set of publicly-available documents describing the
relevant protocols.
- Due to the maturity and age of these protocols, software needed
to use them is now abundant and trivially easy to get and install
and run on a computer. Such software is also very easy to develop
for moderately-skilled software engineers.
- Neither the protocols that define, nor the software that
implement the internet regard any computer to be superior or
inferior to any other computer. For this reason, there is no cost
or capacity barrier for someone to cross in order to run an
internet service: if you have the software, and the internet
connection, then you can expose such a service.
Clear examples from the past of how the accessibility of the
internet technologies has benefited the world include the
following:
- The /Linux/ operating system kernel began life in 1991 as a
college project -- Linus Torvalds wanted to write a computer
operating system that was accessible to all. Linux-based
operating systems now form the basis of a significant proportion
of internet connected computing devices
globally[fn:LinuxProportions:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of_operating_systems]
(including 73% of smartphones and tablet computers, somewhere
between 36% and 66% of internet-facing server computers), and
100% of supercomputers.
- The /Apache/ web server started development when a group of 8
software developers wanted to add functionality to one of the
original web server software packages, /NCSA httpd/. The Apache
web server now powers 43.6% of all web
sites[fn:apacheProportions:[[https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/web_server/all][https://w3techs.com/technologies/overview/web_server/all]]. Incidentally,
the no. 2 on that web page, with nearly 42% share of websites is
/nginx/. It also started out as a project by an individual who
wanted to solve a particular project.].
- The /Firefox/ web browser was initiated by three software
developers who wanted to make a light-weight browser based on the
Mozilla code-base. At the height of its popularity, /Firefox/ was
used in 34% of web-page requests, despite not coming installed by
default on any computer or mobile device. However, its real
impact is that it was instrumental in breaking the monopoly that
Microsoft's Internet Explorer held since the late '90s, resulting
in far richer and more secure web.
When we look at the main services that society is currently
struggling with, we need to consider the following historical
facts:
- Facebook started out as a crude service, developed in Mark
Zuckerberg's room in Harvard University, to allow users (men, of
course) to rate the women in the university in terms of
"hotness".
- Google started out as a search engine called
"Backrub". Development initially took place in a garage.
- eBay was originally an auction service tagged onto the personal
website of its founder, Pierre Omidyar.
- LinkedIn was initially developed in Reid Hoffman's apartment
in 2003.
- Shutterstock, a leading provider of stock images, was founded by
a photographer, John Oringer, who developed the service as a
means to make available 30,000 of his own photographs.
The ease with which internet technology can be accessed has given
rise to the explosion of services that connect people, and people
with businesses.
It is critical to note that many of these technologies and services
started out with an individual or small group developing an idea
and showing it can work *prior* to receiving the large capital
investments that result in their current dominance.
All of the above technologies and services can be considered truly
disruptive. In their respective domains, their arrivals resulted in
a dramatic improvements in internet technologies and services.
However, There are many alternatives to the systems that we are
familiar with, all developed by individuals, or small, enthusiastic
teams:
- /Twitter/ isn't the only micro-blogging service: there's also
/GNU Social/, /Pleroma/, /Mastodon/.
- An alternative to /Facebook/ is /diaspora*/
- /Nextcloud/ and /Owncloud/ are examples of alternatives to
/Dropbox/.
In the cases of all these alternatives, users can sign up for
accounts on "instances" operated by third-party providers, or users
can set up their own instances and operate the services themselves.
Many of these services can federate with others. Federation in this
context means that there can be multiple instances of a service,
communicating with each other over a defined protocol, sharing
updates and posts. For users, federation means that they can
interact with other users who aren't necessarily on the same node
or instance. For administrators of instances, federation means that
they can configure their instances according to their own
preferences, rather than having to abide by the rules or technical
implementation of someone else.
** CONSDONE Regulation of self-hosted services
While it is attractive to create regulations to manage the large,
profit-making organisations, it is imperative that such
regulations don't harm the desire of those who want to create
their own services.
A regulation that apply liability to a service-provider for someone
else's behaviour, is a regulation that can be adhered to only by
organisations with large amounts of money to hand. For example, if
the regulation was to apply liability on me for a posting made by
someone else that appears on one of the services that I run (and
originally posted *somewhere* else -- these are federated services
after all), I would have to shut it down; I am not able to put in
place the necessary infrastructure that would mitigate my
liability[fn:copyrightDirective:This assumes that my services
aren't forced to shut down by the new EU Copyright Directive
anyway]. Given that my services are intended to provide a positive
benefit to me, my family members and my friends, and that I have no
desire to facilitate harmful behaviour on these services, a law
forcing me to shut these services down benefits no one.
Similarly, a regulation that demands responses from services on the
assumption that the service will be manned at all times, requires
individuals who are self-hosting their services to be available at
all times (i.e. to be able to respond regardless of whether they
are asleep, or overseas on a family holiday, too ill to respond,
etc.)
This submission comes from this perspective: that small operators
should not be unduly harmed by regulations; the likelihood of this
harm coming to pass is greater when such small operators are not
even considered during the development of the regulations. If
regulations have the effect[fn:unintended:unintended, one hopes] of
harming such small operators, the result will not just be the loss
of these services, but also the loss of opportunity to make the Web
richer by means of the imposition of artificial barriers to
entry. Such regulations will inhibit the development of ideas that
pop into the heads of individuals, who will realise them with
nothing more than a computer connected to the internet.
* CONSTODO Other considerations
While the main focus of this submission is to highlight the
potential risk to self-hosters from regulation that neglect to
consider the practice, I would like to take the opportunity to
briefly raise some additional concerns
** CONSTODO Abuse
To date, all systems that seek to protect others from harmful or
other objectionable material (e.g. copyright infringement,
terrorism propaganda, etc.) have, to date, been very amenable to
abuse. For example, in a recent court filing, Google claimed that
99.97% of infringement notices it received in from a single party
in January 2017 were
bogus[fn:googleTakedown:https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170223/06160336772/google-report-9995-percent-dmca-takedown-notices-are-bot-generated-bullshit-buckshot.shtml]:
#+BEGIN_QUOTE
A significant portion of the recent increases in DMCA submission
volumes for Google Search stem from notices that appear to be
duplicative, unnecessary, or mistaken. As we explained at the San
Francisco Roundtable, a substantial number of takedown requests
submitted to Google are for URLs that have never been in our search
index, and therefore could never have appeared in our search
results. For example, in January 2017, the most prolific submitter
submitted notices that Google honored for 16,457,433 URLs. But on
further inspection, 16,450,129 (99.97%) of those URLs were not in
our search index in the first place. Nor is this problem limited to
one submitter: in total, 99.95% of all URLs processed from our
Trusted Copyright Removal Program in January 2017 were not in our
index.
#+END_QUOTE
That a single entity would submit more than 16 million URLs for
delisting in a single month is staggering, and demonstrates a
compelling point: there is no downside for a bad-faith actor
seeking to take advantage of a system for suppressing
information[fn:downside:The law being used in this specific case is
the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It contains a provision
that claims of copyright ownership on the part of the claimant are
to be made under penalty of perjury. However, that provision is
very weak, and seems not to be a deterrent for a determined agent:
https://torrentfreak.com/warner-bros-our-false-dmca-takedowns-are-not-a-crime-131115].
The GDPR's /Right to be Forgotten/ is also subject to abuse. An
individual from Europe continues to have stories related to him
excluded from Google searches. However appropriate on the face of
it, the stories this individual is now getting suppressed relate to
his continued abuse of the /Right to be
Forgotten/[fn:RTBF:https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190320/09481541833]. That
the "right" can be abused in this way is counter to the public
interest, as it can now be used like a "Super Injunction".
While the GDPR allows for search engines "... exercising the right
of freedom of expression and information", if they are presented
with /Right to be Forgotten/ demands, they have to choose between
serious sanctions if they don't filter the results when they should
have, or no sanctions if they suppress the results when they didn't
need to.
In systems that facilitate censorship[fn:censorship:While seeking
to achieve a valuable and socially important goal, this
legislation, and all others of its nature, facilitates censorship:
as a society, we should not be so squeamish about admitting this.],
it is important to do more than merely assert that service
providers should protect fundamental rights for expression and
information. In a regime where sending an e-mail costs nearly
nothing, where a service risks serious penalties (up to and
including having to shutdown) and where a claimant suffers nothing
for abusive claims, the regime is guaranteed to be abused.
** CONSTODO Behaviour
** CONSTODO Content moderation
* CONSTODO Answers to consultation questions
The follows are some answers to the questions posed in the call for
submissions.
** CONSTODO Definition of communication in legislation
1. There are currently significant gaps in legislation with regard
to harassment and newer, more modern forms of communication. Is
there a need to expand the definition of ‘communications’ to
include online and digital communications tools such as
WhatsApp, Facebook, Snapchat, etc. when addressing crimes of
bullying or harassment?
- Éibhear comment :: (/Address in introduction/) It is necessary
not to assume that the current services that operate will
be the primary services in 5 or 10 years' time.
2. What lessons can be learned from models used in other
jurisdictions such as the UK, New Zealand, Australia and other
European countries where legislation is now in place to address
these issues? How do we establish an appropriate model without
compromising free speech?
- Éibhear comment :: (/Address in answer to specific questions/)
UK: duty of care is inappropriate. New Zealand: allowing a
committee to decide what is objectionable, thus restricting
not only those who want to share objectionable material,
but also those who want to report on it.
3. How do we ensure that any legislation that is enacted is
flexible enough to keep up with changing and advancing
technologies, new apps and other online forums, including the
more familiar social media sites?
- Éibhear's comments :: (/Core concern/) Hmm. This is the meat
of the submission.
** CONSTODO Harassment, stalking & other forms of online abuse
4. [@4] Online harassment can take the form of on-consensual taking
and distribution of intimate images or videos, otherwise known
as ‘revenge porn’, ‘upskirting’, ‘downblousing’ and other forms
of sharing of imagery online without consent. What approaches
are taken to addressing these issues in other jurisdictions?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
5. New offences are proposed to cover these issues in Deputy
Brendan Howlin’s Private Members Bill on this subject. Is the
creation of new offences necessary, or is existing legislation
sufficient? Should other forms of image-sharing issues - such as
exposure - also be addressed?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
6. What kind of oversight and regulation of online service
providers is possible/used in other jurisdictions? Currently,
online providers are self regulated. Is a proactive,
self-regulating approach from online companies to activities
such as revenge porn and other forms of harassment preferable to
the creation of more laws?
- Éibhear's comment :: Important to know the difference
between "self regulated", and pro-active
moderation. These service moderation according to their
own rules; there is no industry authority like the press
council or the advertising standards authority, which are
self-regulatory regimes.
7. Is any data provided by online service providers in relation to
the reporting or prevalence of activities such as
upskirting/revenge porn/cyberbullying and other online behaviour
that can be used to develop and draft future legislation?
- Éibhear's comment :: No data. However, services should be
encouraged to issue reports on their moderation efforts.
8. To what extent are An Garda Síochána equipped and resourced to
deal with the issues arising from harmful online communications
such as these?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
9. Should ‘cyberstalking’ be treated as a separate offence to
online harassment? What constitutes stalking-type behaviour
online? Is there a need to legislative specifically for this
activity?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
10. Based on the findings of other jurisdictions such as in the UK,
An Garda Síochána will require consistent training in order to
maintain an appropriate level of knowledge with regard to
indictable behaviours. Are resources available for this?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
11. Fake accounts/troll accounts used to harass or target others
with abuse – what measures can be taken in relation to these
without effecting freedom of expression?
- Éibhear's comment :: Care needs to be taken to ensure
manage/prevent false identification of accounts as 'fake'
or 'troll'.
12. Do other jurisdictions have statutory measures to protect
victim identities in cases of online harassment being released
online posthearings, etc?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
** CONSTODO Harmful online behaviour and young people
13. [@13] How do we most appropriately regulate social media
platforms to prevent cyberbullying and inappropriate sharing of
personal images?
- Éibhear's comment :: take details from earlier submission.
14. For young people who participate in such online behaviour as
consensual image sharing, how can it be ensured that they are
not inadvertently criminalised when legislation is enacted?
What safeguards can be put in place?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
15. Deputy Brendan Howlin’s Private Members Bill provides that
those under 17 should not be fined/imprisoned but put into
relevant education or supports. Would these supports be part of
the same educational supports offered to all young
people/schools or would they be a separate entity? Are current
supports being utilised? Are there sufficient resources to
provide for such a provision when enacted?
- Éibhear's comment :: No answer for this
* CONSDONTDO Answers to consultation questions :noexport:
** CONSTODO Strand 1 -- National Legislative Proposal
*** CONSTODO Question 1 -- Systems
- The legislation should state in an unequivocal manner that it is
not the role of web services to adjudicate on whether specific
user-uploaded pieces (text, videos, sound recordings, etc.) can
be considered harmful under the legislation. The law should make
it clear that where there is a controversy on this matter, the
courts will make such rulings.
- As regard a system, this submission would support a
notice-counternotice-and-appeal approach. Such an approach
affords the service operator and the accused party an
opportunity to address the complaint before the complained-of
material is taken offline. The following should be incorporated:
1) A notice to a service operator that a user-uploaded piece is
harmful should contain the following information:
- That the notice is being raised under this legislation
(citing section, if relevant).
- That the person raising the notice is the harmed party, or
that the person raising the notice is doing so on behalf,
and at the request, of the harmed party. Where the harmed
party doesn't want to be identified, the notice could be
raised on their behalf by someone else. However, totally
anonymous notifications under this legislation should not
be permitted, as it would not be possible to determine the
good-faith nature of the notice.
- The specific (narrowly tailored) definition of "harmful
content" in the legislation that is being reported.
2) A notice to the user who uploaded the complained-of material
regarding the complaint. This will allow the user to remove
the material, or to challenge the complaint. An opportunity
to challenge a complaint is necessary to forestall invalid
complaints that seek to have information removed that would
not be considered harmful under the legislation.
3) Adequate time periods for both the complainant and the
posting user to respond.
4) Where responses aren't forthcoming...
- ... if the posting user doesn't respond to the initial
complaint, the posting is to be taken down
- ... if the complaining user doesn't respond to the posting
user's response, the posting is left up.
5) Within a reasonable and defined period of time, the service
provider will assess the initial complaint, the
counter-notice, and the complainant's response to the
counter-notice, and will decide whether to take the material
down or to leaving it up, /citing clear reasons for the
decision./
6) Where either party is not happy with the decision, they can
appeal to the regulator, and if the regulator contradicts the
service operator's decision, the service operator must abide
by the regulator's ruling. In its consideration of the
ruling, the regulator must be required to consider the rights
of both parties.
- Responsibilities and obligations of the service provider *must*
relate to the size of the service. For example, it's not
reasonable to ask the service provider to respond within an
amount of time for those services that would not have someone
available within that time. Self-hosters or small,
single-location, operations would not be able to respond within
an hour if the complaint is made at 4am!
- This system should not apply to complaints that a posting violates the service's terms and conditions. If the complaint isn't explicitly made under this legislation, it should not fall within the regulator's remit. *Under no circumstances should merely violating a service's terms and conditions (or "community standards") be considered an offence under this legislation.*
*** CONSTODO Question 2 -- Statutory tests
The service operator should be protected from liability under the
rules if the service can show the following:
- That the initial complaint was responded to appropriately and
within a reasonable amount of time.
- That an appeal was responded to within a reasonable amount of
time.
- That the poster and complainant were each offered an opportunity
to respond
- That the responses, and any appeals, were given due
consideration.
- That the final decision (whether to keep the post up or pull it
down) was well-reasoned, and considered the context in which the
post was made.
- That, where appeals have been made to the regulator, the service
responds to any order from the regulator in a reasonable manner
and within a reasonable amount of time.
*** CONSTODO Question 3 -- Which platforms to be considered in scope
This submission is concerned to ensure that assumptions not be
made that all affected platforms will be large, for-profit
organisations with scores, or hundreds, or thousands of staff
acting as moderators of user-uploads.
The legislation should also not assume that platforms that want to
deal with user uploads *should* be of a particular nature, or
size.
To make either assumption would be to chill lawful interactions
between internet-connected parties, and would further entrench the
larger players on the internet.
*** CONSTODO Question 4 -- Definitions
- Please see my introductory comments on this matter.
- Definitions of "harmful content" must aim to be as narrow as
possible, in order to avoid the potential of the legislation
being used to target political speech.
- In respect of serious cyberbullying, it should be considered
harmful content under the legislation not just when it targets a
child. It should be considered cyberbullying and harmful even if
it is an adult, if the complaint states that s/he is being
harmed or fears harm should the complained-of behaviour
continue.
+ In the event that the target of the cyberbullying is a public
figure, there should be an additional burden on the
complainant to state that the behaviour represents real intent
to cause harm, and is more than people with opposing political
or social views "shooting their mouths off".
** CONSTODO Strand 2 -- Video Sharing Platform Services
*** CONSTODO Question 5 -- What are video-sharing services
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
*** CONSTODO Question 6 -- Relationship between Regulator and VSPS
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
*** CONSTODO Question 7 -- Review by Regulator
The regulator should require the following reports to be published
by online services regarding complaints made under this
legislation:
- Number of complaints, broken down by nature of complaint
- Number of complaints that were appealed to the service, broken
down by nature of complaint and basis of appeal
- Number of appeals upheld, broken down by reason for appeal
- Number of appeals rejected, broken down by reason for rejection.
- Number of complaints/appeals that were appealed further to the
regulator.
** CONSTODO Strands 3 & 4 -- Audiovisual Media Services
*** CONSTODO Question 8 -- "Content" rules for television broadcasting and on-demand services
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
*** CONSTODO Question 9 -- Funding
RTÉ and its subsidiary services should continue to be funded by
the government, either through the licence fee, general taxation
or a mixture of both. RTÉ's editorial independence should be
re-iterated in this law (and strengthened, if required,
specifically to assure independence from the editorial demands of
advertisers). It should be anticipated that RTÉ will eventually
broadcast only over the internet, and that it will be both a
live-streaming service (e.g. providing programming in a manner
similar to it's current broadcast schedule), *and* an on-demand
service.
Funding of services other than RTÉ should only be considered for
services operated by non-profit organisations such as trusts or
charities, and such funding should also come with an assurance of
editorial independence for the recipients.
** CONSTODO Strands 1 & 2 -- European & International Context
*** CONSTODO Question 10 -- Freedoms
- Core to the consideration of the legislation is that everyone
posting to services are presumed to be innocent of an offence,
and their postings should also be presumed *not* to offend the
law.
- Accusations of harm *must* be tested to determine if they are
being made to suppress legal speech. This is particularly true
where the person making the allegation is a public figure, or is
representing a public figure.
- Where a service applies -- or is required to apply -- sanctions
on users who repeatedly post harmful information, similar
sanctions should also be applied to users who repeatedly make
*false* accusations under the law.
*** CONSTODO Question 11 -- Limited liability
Any regulatory system that makes service providers liable for what
their *users* say on those services will result in one or a
combination of the following effects:
1) Service will stop permitting users to make postings.
2) Where the value of a service is wholly, or in part, that it
allows its users to post to it, the service may have to shut
down.
3) Services will be sued or prosecuted for the actions of its
users *regardless* of the effort and good faith they put in to
"moderating" what is posted on their service -- a concept that
is borderline ludicrous in the off-line world. This would be
analogous to a car manufacturer being liable for the
consequences of car occupants not wearing their seat-belts.
There must be clarity in the regulations that a service is
protected as long as it acts in a good-faith manner to deal with
postings made by users that are determined to have been
illegal. This reflects Ireland's obligations under various trade
agreements to grant safe-harbour protections to internet services.
The regulation must also protect platforms and their users against
bad-faith accusations of harm, particularly from public
figures. If it is easier to use an accusation of "harmful content"
than to claim libel, public figures will use that facility to
suppress information they would like not to be known.
** CONSTODO Strands 1-4 -- Regulatory Structures
*** CONSTODO Question 12 -- Regulatory structure
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
*** CONSTODO Question 13 -- Funding of regulatory structure
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
** CONSTODO Strands 1 & 2 -- Sanctions/Powers
*** CONSTODO Question 14 -- Functions and powers
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
*** CONSTODO Question 15 -- Sanctions
The following should be taken into account when considering
sanctions on platforms
- The nature of the operation
+ Large, global, profit-based private organisations providing
services to the general population. (examples include YouTube,
Facebook, Twitter).
+ Smaller, local, profit-based private organisations providing
services to the general population, focused on the region
(examples might include boards.ie, everymum.ie, etc.)
+ Small, non-profit forums set up by locally-based and -focused
organisations such as soccer clubs, or school parents'
associations[fn:useFacebook:There is often the temptation to
advise these organisations to use larger platforms like
Facebook or Google. Some organisations may not want to avail
of those services, and the reasons for this are not
relevant. What's important is that deciding not to use these
platforms is valid, and these decisions should be protected
and encouraged, not inhibited.]
+ Individuals, hosting their own platforms.
- The good-faith efforts of the operation to respond to
accusations of harm.
- The capacity of the service to respond -- smaller operations
can't afford 24-hour monitoring to respond to such accusations,
and the law should not require it. Such services should be able
to avail of bad-faith actors seeking to interfere with their
operations by overwhelming them with false accusations of harm
that need to be dealt with.
- Who the accuser is -- public figures should be prevented from
using accusations of "harmful content" to remove information
that is merely critical of them or their behaviour.
*** CONSTODO Question 16 -- Thresholds
This submission is not providing an answer to this question.
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